Undervisningsprogram i Praktisk filosofi Höstterminen 2018 Studentkonto, Registrering, Introduktion, Expedition och Studievägledning, Undervisning, Skrivningar, Seminarier, Filosofiska föreningen Kursfordringar Praktisk filosofi A Praktisk filosofi B Praktisk filosofi C Masterprogram Schema över kursutbudet höstterminen 2018 Kursbeskrivningar Kurser som ingår i Praktisk filosofi A Kritiskt tänkande Etik Värdeteori Politisk filosofi Metafysik Kurser som ingår i Praktisk filosofi B Fördjupad kurs i etik: Migration ethics Fördjupad kurs i värdeteori Fördjupad kurs i samhällsfilosofi: The Ethics of Rationing Health B-uppsats C- och Masterkurser Recent work on disagreement The Metaphysics of Margret Cavendish Personal identity Bioethics Philosophy of Law Taste, Fun, Beauty Lärarlista Filosofiska institutionen
Välkommen till studier vid Filosofiska institutionen Studentkonto Som student vid Uppsala universitet behöver du ett studentkonto. Du kan då bl.a. registrera dig på kurser, anmäla dig till skrivningar och kontrollera studieresultat. Du får också en egen e-postadress, tillgång till universitetets fasta och trådlösa nät, du kan lägga upp en egen hemsida, leta och beställa böcker hos universitetsbiblioteket och mycket mer. Kontot är gratis. Läs mer om hur man skaffar Studentkonto här. Registrering För att börja studera måste du registrera dig. Detta gör du på Studentportalen, för kurser som startar vecka 35 senast 23 augusti 2018 och för kurser som startar senare senast 19 september 2018. Se instruktioner på antagningsbeskedet. Har du inte tillgång till internet, kan du kontakta expeditionen på telefon 018-471 72 99. Vänligen var noga med att registrera dig i tid, annars kan du förlora din plats. Avhopp De som av olika skäl inte avser påbörja de studier de blivit antagna till bör snabbast möjligt, inte minst för att ge reserverna en chans, meddela detta till institutionen. Du gör det enklast genom att skicka ett e brev till kursadministratör Ulrika Valdeson ulrika.valdeson@filosofi.uu.se. Introduktion Måndagen den 3 september har vi en informationsträff för alla nya studenter. Ihresalen, Engelska parken, hus 21 (Eng/21-0011) kl. 16:15. Expedition och studievägledning Vi finns på plan 2 i hus 2 i Engelska Parken. Gå till huvudentrén och följ skyltarna. Kursadministrationen sköts av Ulrika Valdeson, 018 471 72 99. Studievägledning sköts av studierektor Rysiek Sliwinski, 018 471 73 51. Man kan även nå per e post (ulrika.valdeson@filosofi.uu.se resp. rysiek.sliwinski@filosofi.uu.se ). Se även vår hemsida www.filosofi.uu.se Undervisning Undervisningen består av föreläsningar och seminarier. Möjligheten att klara av de olika kurserna minskar avsevärt om man inte följer den. Därför rekommenderar vi starkt alla studenter att delta i så mycket undervisning som möjligt. Observera att deltagandet i seminarierna är obligatoriskt. 2
Skrivningar Skrivningarna äger rum inom en vecka efter respektive momentets slut. En andra chans (omskrivning) ges också. Du måste anmäla dig till skrivningar via Studentportalen. Du kan se dina resultat på din hemsida på studentportalen. Seminarier Studerande som är intresserade är även välkomna att delta i de högre seminarierna i praktisk och teoretisk filosofi samt i de övriga seminarierna. Filosofiska föreningen Filosofiska föreningen sammanträder minst fyra gånger per termin. Alla, även icke medlemmar, är välkomna till sammanträdena. Dessa inleds med ett föredrag. Efter föredragen anordnas en sexa, i vilken alla är välkomna att delta. Bli medlem i föreningen under ett läsår genom att betala in (endast) 50 kronor på postgiro 570360 8, så får du personliga kallelser till sammanträdena hem i brevlådan. 3
Kursfordringar Ni som denna termin läser Praktisk filosofi A, heltid dag ska läsa följande moment: Kritiskt tänkande 7,5 hp Etik 7,5 hp Värdeteori 7,5 hp Politisk filosofi 7,5 hp eller Metafysik 7,5 hp Valet mellan Politisk filosofi och Metafysik ska ni göra första vecka i november. Vi kommer att skicka instruktioner om hur ni ska gå tillväga. Undervisning på varje moment består av föreläsningar och gruppseminarier. Seminarierna är obligatoriska. Ni som denna termin läser Praktisk filosofi B ska läsa följande moment: Fördjupad kurs i etik: Migration ethics, 7,5 hp Fördjupad kurs i värdeteori, 7,5 hp Fördjupad kurs i samhällsfilosofi: The Ethics of Rationing Health, 7,5 hp B-uppsats i praktisk filosofi, 7,5 hp Ni som denna termin läser Praktisk filosofi C skall läsa följande moment: C uppsats 15 hp Observera att närvaro i C & magister seminarierna (CM seminarierna) är obligatorisk. Första sammankomst äger rum måndagen den 3 september kl. 10-12 Eng2-1023. Två valfria kurser om 7,5 hp vardera. Se kursutbudet på nästa sida. Ni som läser Masterprogram i humaniora inriktning praktisk filosofi ska normalt läsa två maserkurser och arbeta med ert examensarbete på halvtid. Mer information kommer att skickas runt 20 augusti. 4
KURSUTBUD I PRAKTISK FILOSOFI HÖSTTERMINEN 2018 Kritiskt tänkande Etik PRAKTISK FILOSOFI A Värdeteori Politisk filosofi Maria Svedberg Maria Svedberg Jens Johansson Emil Andersson Metafysik Erik Carlson Fördjupad kurs i etik: Migration ethics Patricia Mindus PRAKTISK FILOSOFI B Fördjupad kurs i värdeteori Andrew Reisner Fördjupad kurs i samhällsfilosofi: The Ethics of Rationing Healthcare Andrew Reisner B-uppsats Jens Johansson och Emil Andersson VALFRIA KURSER PÅ C- OCH MASTERNIVÅ Recent work on disagreement Folke Tersman och Don Loeb The Metaphysics of Margaret Cavendish Jonathan Shaheen Personal identity Jens Johansson Bioethics Andrew Reisner och Elena Prats Philosophy of Law Patricia Mindus Taste, Fun, Beauty Andreas Stokke CM seminariet i praktisk filosofi Erik Carlson Högre seminariet i praktisk filosofi Folke Tersman SEMINARIER 5
KURSBESKRIVNINGAR KURSER SOM INGÅR I PRAKTISK FILOSOFI A Kritiskt tänkande Lärare: Maria Svedberg, Anna Folland, Carl Montan, Simon Rosenqvist Kurslitteratur: Bowell, Tracy & Kemp, Gary, Critical Thinking: A Concise Guide, 4th edition, Routledge, 2014. 6
Etik Lärare: Maria Svedberg, Guilherme Marques Pedro och Sebastian Reyes Molina. Kurslitteratur o Shafer-Landau, Russ, Fundamentals of Ethics, 3:e eller 4:e upplagan, Oxford University Press, 2014/2017. o Shafer-Landau, Russ, The Ethical Life: Readings in Ethics and Moral Problems, 3:e eller 4:e upplagan, Oxford University Press, 2014. 7
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Värdeteori Lärare: Jens Johansson och Anna Folland Kurslitteratur: o Bergström, Lars: Grundbok i värdeteori,thales, 2004 o Shafer-Landau, Russ, Fundamentals of Ethics, 3:e eller 4:e upplagan, Oxford University Press, 2014/2017. o Shafer-Landau, Russ, The Ethical Life: Readings in Ethics and Moral Problems, 3:e eller 4:e upplagan, Oxford University Press, 2014/2017. 9
Politisk filosofi Lärare: Emil Andersson Kurslitteratur: Kymlica, Will, Modern politisk filosofi, Bokförlaget Nya Doxa (Stockholm: Symposium, 2007) 10
Metafysik Lärare: Erik Carlson Kurslitteratur: Earl Conee & Theodore Sider, Riddles of Existence, Oxford University Press, 2005. John W. Carroll & Ned Markosian, An Introduction to Metaphysics (Cambridge UP, 2010.) Hemtentamen. 11
KURSER SOM INGÅR I PRAKTISK FILOSOFI B Fördjupad kurs i etik: Migration ethics Lärare: Patricia Mindus, Tommaso Braida, Guilherme Marques Pedro, Sebastian Reyes Kurslitteratur o Texterna kommer att finnas tillgängligt på Studentportalen. 12
Fördjupad kurs i värdeteori Lärare: Andrew Reisner Kurslitteratur o Fisher, Andrew, Metaethics: An Introduction, Routledge, 2014. 13
Fördjupad kurs i samhällsfilosofi: The Ethics of Rationing Health Lärare: Andrew Reisner Kurslitteratur: o Barnhill, Anne, Budolfson, Mark, and Doggett, Tyler, The Ethics of Health Care Rationing: An Introduction, Routledge, 2014 B-uppsats i praktisk filosofi Första sammankomst tisdagen 26 september kl. 13:15-15 Eng7-0043. Redovisning av uppsatserna vecka 3 (januari 2019). 14
C- OCH MASTERKURSER Recent work on disagreement Instructors: Folke Tersman och Don Loeb Disagreement is a central concept in many philosophical discussions. It provides the point of departure of a familiar argument against the idea that moral judgments can be objectively true, but similar arguments have been advanced in other philosophical areas also. Disagreement is taken to generate philosophical implications partly because it is supposed to motivate doubts about, or reduced confidence in, those of our convictions that are contested, at least insofar as our opponents are not less well equipped than us in terms of availability of evidence, reasoning skills, and so on. The purpose of the course is to examine various arguments to that effect, as well as the more fundamental views about knowledge, truth and epistemic justification upon which those arguments rely. We shall specifically focus on ideas, positions, and arguments that have emerged in recent discussions. To illustrate the various arguments and positions that are to be examined we shall use example both from philosophical and from nonphilosophical contexts. Assessment Class participation and a 7,500-word essay (a 10,000-word essay for PhDstudents) on a topic approved by the teachers. Due October 1st 2018. Students may be asked to initiate the discussion at a lecture by giving a short presentation of relevant text(s). Schedule and venues 15
Themes and literature The list of readings may be slightly revised before the course begins. A final list will be provided one week ahead of the first lecture. The readings are, with a few exceptions, available through the library s e-resources (the exceptions will be distributed during the course). If you have problems in finding any of them please contact the teachers. Theme 1: Introduction. Lectures 1 & 2 will be spent on giving an overview about the aspects of the recent debate about disagreement that we plan to cover. We shall indicate the various arguments and positions that the discussion revolves around, the problems those arguments and positions are facing, and how they are related to other issues and views in epistemology and metaphysics. The overview is meant to provide a background for the subsequent discussions. Literature: Machuca, D. 2017. Moral Skepticism. An Introduction and Overview. In Machuca, ed., Moral Skepticism: New Essays, London: Routledge, 1-32. Matheson, J. 2015. Disagreement and Epistemic Peers, Oxford Handbooks Online. Theme 2: Conciliationism and steadfastness. Conciliationism is a position that has emerged within the peer disagreement debate. It entails, as an initial approximation, that we should reduce our confidence in the truth of a claim we accept if we find that it is rejected by an epistemic peer. Conciliationism is challenged by various philosophers who advocate steadfastness in the face of such opposition. Lectures 3 & 4 will be devoted to the recent discussion about these competing positions. We shall distinguish between different versions of them, explore their implications, and also discuss how they are related to the various epistemic principles that are employed by traditional arguments from disagreement. Literature: Christensen, D. 2011. Disagreement, Question-Begging and Epistemic Self- Criticism, Philosophers Imprint 11. Elga, A. 2007. Reflection and Disagreement, Nous 41, 478 502. Kelly, T. 2005. The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement, Oxford Studies in Epistemology 1. Kornblith, H. 2010. Belief in the face of controversy, in Feldman, R. & Warfield, T., eds., Disagreement, Oxford: OUP. Theme 3: Permissivism and uniqueness. One might try to avoid having to draw skeptical conclusions from the occurrence of disagreement by adopting some form of epistemological relativism, to the effect that people could be justified in 16
having conflicting beliefs even when they share evidence. That view is congenial with a position known as permissivism. Permissivism challenges the socalled uniqueness thesis, which, roughly, is the view that there is a unique rational response to a given body of evidence. In lectures 5 & 6, we shall address the debate between permissivists and impermissivists and discuss how it relates to the discussions about disagreement and skepticism. Literature Christensen, D. 2016. Conciliation, Uniqueness and Rational Toxicity, Noûs 50, no. 3, 584 603. Feldman, R. 2007. Reasonable Religious Disagreements, in Philosophers without God, Antony, L., ed., Oxford University Press. Schoenfield, M. 2014, Permission to Believe: Why Permissivism is True and What it Tells Us About Irrelevant Influences on Belief, Noûs 48, 193-218. White, R. 2005. Epistemic Permissivism, Philosophical Perspectives 19, 445-59. Theme 4: Explaining the epistemic significance of disagreement. The epistemic assumptions that arguments from disagreement invoke (such as assumptions to the effect that the proper response to peer disagreement is to revise ones confidence about the disputed claim) are sometimes simply taken for granted or supported with intuitions about imagined cases. In other cases, however, philosophers try to explain why disagreement generates skeptical implications with reference to more fundamental principles about what justification and knowledge require. According to one such principle, the justification of a belief depends on the evidence we have for it. The idea is that disagreement constitutes a type of evidence that is relevant to the assessment of a belief. That is one of the possibilities that we shall address in lectures 7 & 8. We shall also explore the relevance of modal requirements on knowledge, such as those according to which knowledge requires sensitivity, safety, and adherence. Literature: Christensen, D. 2010. Higher-Order Evidence, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 81, 185-215. Kelly, T. 2010. Peer Disagreement and Higher Order Evidence, In R. Feldman & T. A. Warfield, eds., Disagreement. Oxford: OUP. Risberg, O. and Tersman, F. Disagreement and Skepticism: A Novel Approach (unpublished ms). Theme 5: Overgeneralization and self-defeat. Arguments for moral skepticism that appeal to moral disagreement are sometimes criticized on the ground that they overgeneralize and can be extended also to other areas, both within and outside of philosophy. After all, disagreement is a phenomenon that does not on- 17
ly occur in ethics but in many if not all areas as well. The (alleged) fact that skeptical arguments from moral disagreement can be applied (mutatis mutandis) also to other areas is supposed to reduce the urgency of these arguments, partly because skepticism is not thought to be a viable position in some of those areas. We shall address these worries in lectures 9 & 10. One type of criticism that is connected to the overgeneralization worries concerns the coherence of arguments from disagreement. Such arguments generally invoke epistemic principles to the effect that the proper response to disagreement of certain types is to reduce one s confidence in the disputed claim or to drop one s verdicts about it. Those principles, however, are in turn the object of disagreement, which is thought to make the arguments vulnerable to the criticism that they are self-defeating in a problematic sense. This type of criticism will also be explored in lectures 9 & 10. Literature: Matheson, J. 2015. Are Conciliatory Views of Disagreement Self-Defeating, Social Epistemology 29, 145-59. Pittard, J. 2015. Resolute Conciliationism, Philosophical Quarterly 65, 442-63. Tersman, F. and Loeb, D. (unpublished ms). Evidence of Peerhood and Moral Disagreement. Vavova, K. 2014. Moral Disagreement and Moral Skepticism, Philosophical Perspectives 28, 302-33. Additional readings (not compulsory): Ballantyne, N. and Coffman, E.(2011. Uniqueness, Evidence, and Rationality, Philosophers Imprint 11 no. 18, 1 13. Brueckner, A. and Bundy, A. 2012. On Epistemic Permissiveness, Synthese 188 no. 2, 165-77. Christensen, D. 2007. Epistemology of Disagreement: The Good News, Philosophical Review 116, 187 217. Christensen, D. 2009. "Disagreement as Evidence: The Epistemology of Controversy," Philosophy Compass 4, 1-11. Christensen, D. 2013. Epistemic Modesty Defended, in Christensen, D. and Lackey, J. eds., The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays, Oxford University Press, 77-97. Elga, A. 2010. How to Disagree About How to Disagree, in Feldman, R. and Warfield, T., Disagreement, Oxford University Press. Enoch, D. 2010. Not Just a Truthometer: Taking Oneself Seriously (but not Too Seriously) in cases of Peer Disagreement, Mind 119 no. 476, 953-97. 18
Feldman, R. 2006. Epistemological Puzzles About Disagreement, in Epistemology Futures, Hetherington, S., ed., New York: Oxford University Press, 216 36. Frances, B. and Matheson, J. 2018. Disagreement," The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Zalta, E., ed., https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/disagreement/ Fumerton, R. (2010). You Can t Trust a Philosopher, in Feldman, R. and Warfield, T., Disagreement, Oxford University Press. Goldman, A. 2010. Epistemic Relativism and Reasonable Disagreement, in Feldman, R. and Warfield, T., eds., Disagreement, Oxford University Press. Greco, D. and Hedden, B. 2016. Uniqueness and Metaepistemology, Journal of Philosophy 113 no. 8, 365-95. Horowitz, S. 2014. Immoderately rational, Philosophical Studies 167 no. 1, 41-56. Kelly, T. 2013. Evidence Can Be Permissive, in Steup, M., Turri, J., and Sosa, E., eds., Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, 2d ed., 298-311. King, N. 2008. Religious Diversity and its Challenges to Religious Belief, Philosophy Compass 3. no. 4, 830 53. King, N. 2012. Disagreement: What s the Problem? or A Good Peer is Hard to Find, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 no. 2, 249-72. Kopek, M. and Titelbaum, M. 2005. The Uniqueness Thesis, Philosophy Compass 11, 189-200. Lackey, J. 2010. What should we do when we disagree? in Gendler, T., and Hawthorne, J., eds., Oxford Studies in Epistemology 3, 274-93. Lackey, J. 2010. A Justificationist View of Disagreement s Epistemic Significance, in Haddock, A., Millar, A., and Pritchard, D., eds., Social Epistemology, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Lackey, J. 2013. Disagreement and Belief Dependence. in Lackey, J. and Christensen, D., eds., The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays, Oxford University Press. Lasonen-Aarnio, M. 2014. Higher Order Evidence and the Limits of Defeat, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 no. 2, 314-45. Levinstein, B. 2017. Permissive Rationality and Sensitivity, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 no. 2, 342-70. Meacham, C. 2013. Impermissive Bayesianism, Erkenntnis (S6) 1-33. Oppy, G. 2010. Disagreement, International Journal of Philosophy of Religion 68, 183-99. Pettit, P. 2006. When to Defer to Majority Testimony and When Not, Analysis 66, 179 87. Sosa, E. 2010. The Epistemology of Disagreement, in Armchair Philosophy, Princeton: Princeton University Press. Steel, R. (forthcoming). Anticipating Failure and Avoiding It, Philosophical Imprint, available at https://www.robertjsteel.com/papers.html. 19
Strevens 2017. Notes on Bayesian Confirmation Theory, (unpublished ms), available at http://www.nyu.edu/classes/strevens/bct/bct.pdf. van Inwagen, P. 1996. It is Wrong, Everywhere, Always, and for Anyone, to Believe Anything upon Insufficient Evidence, in Faith, Freedom, and Rationality, Jordan, J. and Howard-Snyder, D., eds., Hanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 137 54. Wedgwood, R. 2010. The Moral Evil Demons, in Feldman, R. and Warfield, T., eds., Disagreement, Oxford University Press. Weatherson, B. 2013. Disagreements, Philosophical and Otherwise, in Lackey, J. and Christensen, D., eds., The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays, Oxford University Press. White, R. 2009. On Treating Oneself and Others as Thermometers, Episteme 6, 233-50. White, R. 2013. Evidence Cannot Be Permissive, in Steup, M., Turri, J., and Sosa, E. eds., Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, 2d ed., 312-23. 20
The Metaphysics of Margaret Cavendish Lärare: Jonathan Shaheen Kurslitteratur: Ett textkompendium mer information kommer att finnas på Studentportalen. Personal identity Lärare: Jens Johansson Kurslitteratur: Ett textkompendium mer information kommer att finnas på Studentportalen. 21
Bioethics Lärare: Andrew Reisner och Elena Prats Kurslitteratur: Ett textkompendium mer information kommer att finnas på Studentportalen. 22
Philosophy of Law Lärare: Patricia Mindus, Tommaso Braida, Elena Prats och Sebastian Andres Reyes Molina. Kurslitteratur: o Wacks, Raymond, Understanding Jurisprudence. An Introduction to Legal Theory, Oxford University Press 2012. o Freeman, Michael, Lloyd s Introduction to Jurisprudence, Sweet & Maxwell, London 2011 (8th ed.) See also info at Studentportalen (home page for the course) 23
Taste, Fun, Beauty: Predicates of Personal Taste Teacher Andreas Stokke andreas.stokke@filosofi.uu.se Interested students should email me to be included in future announcements about the course. Course Description This course will be concerned with predicates of personal taste, such tasty, funny, and beautiful. Suppose you like broccoli, and your friend doesn t. You say, Broccoli is tasty! but your friend replies, No! Broccoli is disgusting. There s a strong sense that the debate you are having is different in some important way from debates you might have where one of you says, Napoleon was born on Malta, and the other one says, No, he wasn't. Intuitively, in your debate over Napoleon, we think one of you must be right. But in the former case, there s a sense in which we think that Broccoli is tasty and Broccoli isn t tasty can both be right, depending on who is saying or judging these statements. Within philosophy of language and other areas of philosophy this, and other issues surrounding predicates like tasty, has spawned a range of discussion over how such discourse is to be understood within different frameworks for theorizing about the relation between language, world, mind, and context. Should we think that there are definite conditions for when something is tasty or not and that Broccoli is tasty is simply true or false depending on certain facts about broccoli, or should we think that Broccoli is tasty hides more content than meets the eye. Alternatively, perhaps there s a way of making sense of the idea that Broccoli is tasty is true for some people but not for others. We will study debates mainly within philosophy of language, but will also consider issues that connect to aesthetics, metaethics, and other areas of philosophy. A major part of this course will be the opposition between so-called contextualism and relativism about evaluative discourse. We will look at the central debates over how to understand disagreement over things like taste, fun, and beauty. The course will be conducted in English. The course will not assume any technical background in semantics or pragmatics. 24
Timetable Sessions and Readings The plan for the sessions with required readings is as follows. The plan may change during the course, depending on the interests of the participants. Session 1. Course Introduction Cappelen, H. & Dever, J. (2016) Context and Communication, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 4.1-4.4, 5.1-5.3 Cappelen, H. & Huvenes, T. Relative Truth, forthcoming in Oxford Handbook of Truth, available at http://www.huvenes.net/papers/relativetruth.pdf Stojanovic, I. Relativism, forthcoming in Routledge Handbook of Metaethics, available at https://philpapers.org/archive/stor-14.pdf Sessions 2 & 3. Truth, Propositions, and Objectivism Cappelen & Dever (2016, 4.1-4.4, 5.1-5.3) MacFarlane, J. (2014) Assessment Sensitivity: Relative Truth and Its Applications, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1.1 Cappelen, J. & Hawthorne, J. (2009) Relativism and Monadic Truth, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 1-10 Sessions 4 & 5. Contextualism MacFarlane (2014, 1.2, 141-47) Huvenes, T. (2011) Varieties of Disagreement and Predicates of Taste, Australasian Journal of Philosophy Marques, T. (2015) "Disagreeing in Context, Frontiers in Psychology 6: 1-12. 25
Sessions 6 & 7. Relativism MacFarlane (2014, 1.4, ch. 2-3) MacFarlane, J. (2007) Relativism and Disagreement, Philosophical Studies 132: 17-31 Marques, T. (2018) Retractions, Synthese 195 (8): 3335-3359 Sessions 8 & 9. Expressivism & Aquiantance (with guest lecture by Nils Franzén) MacFarlane (2014, 1.3) Franzén, N. (2018) Aesthetic Evaluation and First-Hand Experience, Australasian Journal of Philosophy Online https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2018.1425729 Ninan, D. (2014) "Taste Predicates and the Acquaintance Inference", Semantics and Linguistic Theory 24: 290 309. Robson, J. (2012) "Aesthetic Testimony", Philosophy Compass 7/1: 1 10. Session 10. Tba Examination The exam for the course will be a paper of 3000-5000 words on a freely chosen topic related to those of the course. The exam paper will be due 10 January 2019. Secondary Readings Baghramian & Carter, Relativism, SEP, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/relativism/ Richard, M. (2004) Contextualism and Relativism Philosophical Studies 119: 215-42 Richard, M. (2008) When Truth Gives Out, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press Other Resources Video Mark Schroeder & Jamie Dreier: Moral Relativism, Expressivism & Contextualism https://goo.gl/f7cqqi Crispin Wright: Making Sense of Faultless Disagreement https://goo.gl/axfffz Audio "Kieran Setiya discusses moral disagreement Elucidations. Podcast. https://goo.gl/5tebev 26
"Robert Stalnaker discusses conversational context Elucidations. Podcast. https://goo.gl/yirzyj Elisabeth Schellekens Dammann on Disagreement about Taste Philosophy Bites. Podcast. https://goo.gl/tw7l8g Relativism In Our Time. BBC. Podcast. https://goo.gl/symqsg On Doing Philosophy Kagan, S. How to Write a Philosophy Paper, available at https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/1614655/kaganhowtowritea.pdf Pryor, J. Philosophical Terms and Metods, http://www.jimpryor.net/teaching/vocab/index.html Pryor, J. How To Read a Philosophy Paper, http://www.jimpryor.net/teaching/guidelines/reading.html Pryor, J. Guidelines on Writing a Philosophy Paper, http://www.jimpryor.net/teaching/guidelines/writing.html 27
Filosofiska Institutionen, Uppsala universitet Postadress: Box 627, 751 26 Uppsala Besöksadress: Engelska parken, Humanistiskt centrum, Thunbergsvägen 3 H, hus 2. Hemsida http://www.filosofi.uu.se Prefekt Matti Eklund 018 471 73 56 <matti.eklund@filosofi.uu.se> Programansvarig KOSA Andrew Reisner 018 471 73 52 <andrew.reisner@filosofi.uu.se> Studierektor grundutbildning Rysiek Sliwinski 018 471 73 51 <rysiek.sliwinski@filosofi.uu.se> Studierektor forskarutbildning Elisabeth Schellekens Dammann 018 471 73 50 <elisabeth.schellekens@filosofi.uu.se> Kursadministratör Ulrika Valdeson 018 471 72 99 <ulrika.valdeson@filosofi.uu.se> Lärare vid Filosofiska institutionen höstterminen 2018 ANDERSSON, Emil <emil.andersson@filosofi.uu.se> BRAIDA Tommaso, <tommaso.braida@filosofi.uu.se> CARLSON, Erik <erik.carlson@filosofi.uu.se> DAMMANN, Guy <guy.dammann@filosofi.uu.se> EKENBERG, Tomas <tomas.ekenberg@filosofi.uu.se> EKLUND, Matti <matti.eklund@filosofi.uu.se> ENTZENBERG, Claes <claes.entzenberg@estetik.uu.se> FELKA, Katharina, <katharina.felka@filosofi.uu.se> FORSBERG, Maria, <maria.forsberg@filosofi.uu.se> FRANZÉN, Nils, <nils.franzen@filosofi.uu.se> JOHANSSON, Jens <jens.johansson@filosofi.uu.se > KRISTENSEN, Kasper <kasper.kristensen@filosofi.uu.se > LAMARQUE, Peter, <p.v.lamarque@york.ac.uk> LOEB, Don, <don.loeb@uvm.edu> LUTZ, Sebastian <sebastian.lutz@filosofi.uu.se> MARTINEZ MARIN, Irene <irene.martinez@filosofi.uu.se> MARQUES PEDRO, Guilherme, <guilhermemarquespedro@filosofi.uu.se> MINDUS, Patricia <patricia.mindus@filosofi.uu.se > PAGE, Jeremy <jeremy.page@filosofi.uu.se> PEPP, Jessica <jessica.pepp@filosofi.uu.se> PETTERSSON, Olof <olof.pettersson@filosofi.uu.se> PRATS, Elena <elena.prats@filosofi.uu.se> 28
REISNER, Andrew <andrew.reisner@filosofi.uu.se> REMES, Pauliina <pauliina.remes@filosofi.uu.se> REYES MOLINA, Sebastian <sebastian.reyes@filosofi.uu.se> RIDER, Sharon <sharon.rider@filosofi.uu.se> ROSENQVIST, Simon <simon.rosenqvist@filosofi.uu.se> SCHELLEKENS DAMMANN, Elisabeth <elisabeth.schellekens@filosofi.uu.se> SHAHEEN, Jonathan <jonathan.shaheen@filosofi.uu.se> SLIWINSKI, Rysiek <rysiek.sliwinski@filosofi.uu.se> STOKKE, Andreas <andreas.stokke@filosofi.uu.se> STÖPFGESHOFF, Alexander <alexander.stopfgeshoff@filosofi.uu.se> SVEDBERG, Maria <maria.svedberg@filosofi.uu.se> TERSMAN, Folke <folke.tersman@filosofi.uu.se> TVEDT, Oda <oda.tvedt@filosofi.uu.se> WALLBANK, Rebecca <rebecca.wallbank@filosofi.uu.se> WIKBLOM, Andreas <andreas.wikblom@estetik.uu.se> 29