THE ROLES OF WOMEN IN SUPPORTING, JOINING, INTERVENING IN, AND PREVENTING VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN SANDJAK

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1 THE ROLES OF WOMEN IN SUPPORTING, JOINING, INTERVENING IN, AND PREVENTING VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN SANDJAK Analysis of the Drivers of Violent Extremism in the Sandjak region with a Focus on Women s Roles, including a Stakeholder Capacity Assessment Regarding Gender Issues

2 By Anne Speckhard, Ph.D. & Ardian Shajkovci, Ph.D. December 21, 2016 TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction Defining Violent Extremism Methodology Analysis Findings Trajectories into Violent Extremism and Terrorism in Sandjak Responses Legal Infrastructure: International and Governmental and Non-Governmental Response Women s Roles Current Women Initiatives and Policy Recommendations

3 LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS SP OSCE UNDP EULEX FSA ISIS Sandjak Police Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe United Nations Development Program The European Union Rule of Law Mission in Sandjak Free Syrian Army Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant Special thanks to UN Women for supporting this research.

4 INTRODUCTION The purpose of this report is to address radicalization, including radicalization leading to violent extremism, in the Sandjak region, a predominantly Muslim region in southern Serbia. This report will also explore the roles of women in supporting, joining, intervening in, and preventing violent extremism. It is based on a desk review of research and interviews conducted in Novi Pazar with a range of subjects including representatives of local NGOs, educators, religious leaders, city council representatives, and representatives of national and international organizations between October 27 and October 30, During two decades of researching hundreds of terrorists, Speckhard found the usual and necessary components to make a terrorist are: a group, its ideology, social support, and individual vulnerabilities and motivations which break out according to whether one lives in a conflict zone our outside of one. 1 In the case of Sandjak region, the primary groups operating and radicalizing citizens into violent extremism are militant jihadi groups operating in Syria. The municipality of Novi Pazar, including the Sandjak region, is also known for the activities of a small group of extremists connected to the Wahhabi/Salafi strand of Islam. Ethnic and political divisions dating since the break-up of the former Yugoslavia in the early 90s characterize the Sandjak region. Its residents continue to experience high levels of unemployment, lack of investment, and lack of adequate education, all social and economic issues that many blame on the national government as features of marginalization, discrimination, and neglect towards its Muslim populations. The region is also caught between right-wing nationalist sentiments, strongly associated with the Serbian Orthodox Church, and an Islamic Community with two religious leadership centers, one in Belgrade (Islamic Community of Serbia) and the other in Novi Pazar (Islamic Community in Serbia), with the latter pledging its loyalty to the leadership in Sarajevo, Bosnia. Residents of the region remain torn between dual religious leadership that each claim religious superiority over the other. They represent two intense factions, each guided by a scorching rhetoric that caters to different masses, often leading to violent confrontations among them. 2 The Islamic Community in Serbia (ICiS) is vocal against the Serbian authorities when it comes to protection of religious rights and what they perceive to be obstruction of economic development in the region, and views the Islamic Community of Serbia (ICoS) as a creation of the Serbian state security services. ICoS, on the other hand, considers ICiS as a solely religious organization with local impact and character but no political clout or ability to represent Muslims in Sandjak. However, the Mufti and the former president of the ICiS, Muamer Zukorlic, recently 1 Anne Speckhard, The Lethal Coctail of Terrorism, The International Center for the Study of Violent 2 For instance, November 2007 brawl and shooting incident at Altun-alem mosque in the center of Novi Pazar. See

5 retired and became a Parliamentarian with considerable political clout both in Belgrade and Novi Pazar. The current struggle and conflict within the Islamic Community in the region transcends local religious predilections and affiliations, however. As noted by many respondents in our research, the conflict is also about financial gains and local political expediency that is, about the control of the Islamic Community s religious assets, its charity funds, both local and international, its ability to control and raise funds and about job allocation. Between the two, there is also a fierce competition over a great deal of money collected for organizing annual Hajj pilgrimages, money that goes to one or the other depending on the membership answering to them. Although many of the struggles within the Islamic Community remain rooted in the political struggles of the past, the split continues to affect inter-ethnic and intra-bosnian relations both within the Sandjak region and inside Serbia. As a consequence of the wars of the 90s and the subsequent dissolution of the former Yugoslavia, Serbia, like its surrounding neighbors, has seen the flow of foreign money and religious ideologies streaming into its borders and greatly influencing the region s Muslim population. Schisms within the Islamic Community have been influenced by the emergence of external conservative influences entering Sandjak, such as Wahhabi/Salafi streams of thought emanating from the Gulf region. In Novi Pazar, one cannot help but notice conservative Wahhabi/Salafi communities some of these communities entirely isolated from the rest of the mainstream society and women dressed in full niqab. Interviewed parties presented conflicting arguments as to the threat level such conservative communities might potentially represent and what triggers their formation and behavior, though views presented by some respondents were that such groups are in support of jihadist narratives and constitute a serious security threat in the region. Others stated that Wahhabis appear to radicalize sectors of the population and to hinder successful integration and counter radicalization efforts in the region. The emergence of groups of Wahhabi/Salafi adherents were at first encouraged by the former Mufti of ICiS, Muamer Zukorlic, who used his control over them as a bargaining chip with Belgrade. However, that seems to have backfired as Wahhabi/Salafi groups are now often critical of the ICiS leadership, labeling them, and the former Mufti in particular, as corrupt and materialistic. 3. Such comments appear to reflect concerns shared by many in the community reaching beyond these Wahhabi groups regarding the economic dominance and what seems to many as corrupt business dealings in Novi Pazar currently carried out by the former Mufti. 4 Indeed, the confluence of both factors may constitute a radicalizing force:the appearance of a vast accumulation of wealth via corruption coupled with a conservative Islamic narrative that fosters belief in claims for an alternative and more just world order. 3 S.K. Interview, Sandjak Committee for Human Rights and Freedoms, October 27, 2016, Novi Pazar. 4 Ibid.

6 With the advent of the Syrian conflict and the rise of ISIS, the Sandjak s Muslims have not been immune to recruitment. It is difficult to come by publicly available and official data related to the participation of citizens of the Sandjak region, including Novi Pazar, in the Syrian and the Iraq conflict, as officials are secretive about such data and do not publish or share it willingly. Estimates from respondents are that anywhere from residents of the Sandjak region, of which are from Novi Pazar, have travelled to Syria and the Iraq and joined the so-called Islamic State. There are also others who either directly or indirectly continue to support such recruitment and efforts at building an Islamic Caliphate in Syria and Iraq. Ethnic tensions, coupled with unstable economic, social, and institutional foundations (e.g. high levels of unemployment, distrust in centralized power, prevailing corruption, lack of rule of law, inability on the part of government to curb violence and hate crimes and speech, perceived and real experiences of social isolation of ethnic Bosniaks and Muslim groups from Serbian political, social spheres, etc.) continue to fuel extremist rhetoric and may lead to further escalation of radicalism and violent extremism in the region. In fact, several of the participants stressed, especially among the young, the feelings of insecurity and distrust in economic, social, and institutional foundations as a main motivator for joining the conflicts in Iraq and Syria, and pointed out a direct relationship between what they perceived as injustices witnessed in the Syrian and the Iraq conflict and the injustices in terms of discrimination many in Sandjak continue to experience within their families and communities. This report will discuss radicalization, including radicalization leading to violent extremism, in the Sandjak region based on interviews in Novi Pazar. Several risk factors will be discussed to understand better the drivers of radicalization and violent extremism. Moreover, similar to neighboring Kosovo, while there is a national-level discussion on violent extremism in the country, there is a limited policy or programmatic discussion on the role of women in preventing violent extremism, rehabilitating former extremists, or how they can be included in the country s national counter-terrorism initiatives and strategies. In this regard, this report will also discuss women s roles both in becoming violent extremist and in preventing and countering violent extremism. Estimates are that since the start of the Syrian conflict in 2011, upwards of 38,000 foreign fighters have joined Sunni militant groups, such as ISIS and al-qaeda, in Iraq and Syria. 5 Roughly 5,000 have joined from Western Europe, of which roughly 3,700 have originated from France, Germany, Belgium, and U.K. It is estimated that 875 have originated from the Balkans, of which almost 800 are reported to have come from the western Balkan countries of Kosovo, Albania, Bosnia, and Macedonia. 6 On a per capita basis (per million of its citizens), these four 5 NCTC Director Nicholas Rasmussen testimony before the House Committee on Homeland Security. Available at The Soufan Group report dated 2015 estimates the number to be between 27,000-31, The Soufan Group 2015 report. See

7 Western Balkan countries have a higher representation of foreign fighters compared to the four Western European countries with the highest per capita foreign fighters. Serbia, being predominantly Christian, has a much lower per capita representation of foreign fighters; however, when the Sandjak s per capita figures (which vary depending on what source is used) are isolated and extrapolated per population of 200,000 to be able to compare to the rest of the Balkans, Sandjak has the unique distinction of having either the highest or the second highest per capita representation, following Kosovo, of citizens of any country in wider Europe who left for Syria and Iraq since Table One: Balkan Foreign Fighter Breakdown by Country Ranking Ranking Number of foreign fighters Ranking Number of foreign fighters (on a per capita basis/per million) Barret & Soufan Group 2 Kosovo Sandjak region of Serbia 15 to Bosnia Albania Serbia Macedonia Montenegro NA 7 NA 7 Romania NA 8 NA 10 Greece NA 9 NA 11 Bulgaria NA 10 NA Source: Country sources, ICSR and The Soufan Group ( ) Bosnia has the highest representation of foreign fighters among the Balkan countries included in the list (330). However, on a per capita basis (per million of its citizens), Sandjak and Kosovo top the list. 8 Sandjak Police, October Judge and Local Council Representative Interview, October 29, 2016, Novi Pazar. 10 Neumann Peter, Foreign Fighter Total in Syria/Iraq now Exceeds 20,000; Surpasses Afghanistan Conflict in the 1980s, January 2015, available at The Soufan Group, Foreign Fighters: An

8 The issue of foreign fighters and their involvement in the Syrian and the Iraq conflict, including the rising fears that returnees from the Syrian and the Iraq conflict may plot attacks in their home countries, has created concerns at the highest echelons of the Balkan political systems, including in the Sandjak region and in Belgrade. Despite the Serbian government s progress in the field of counterterrorism, such as the passage of foreign fighter legislation in 2014 that raises prison sentences for those participating in foreign wars and is primarily introduced to dissuade its citizens from participating in the Syrian and the Iraq conflict, it still lacks a comprehensive national strategy or action plan to counter violent extremism (CVE). 11 State-level policies are binding for the local level as well (i.e. the Sandjak region), although they do not directly reference measures to prevent radicalization and violent extremism in the region. Although efforts by international organizations in the region are currently primarily focused on addressing the most pressing socio-economic and political issues (e.g. Swiss Embassy, OSCE, etc.),a number of local NGOs have undertaken projects to address the issue of radicalization and extremism as well. The current situation remains both dangerous and volatile. Foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq are expected to return home, and some who are not originally from the Balkans may even choose to migrate to the Sandjak region if they find that they can slip in and live there under the radar of government and security services. Given that police in the region tend to be Serbian ethnic nationals and do not reflect the character of local population, do not have a strong community policing model, and have not won the trust of locals, the possibility of foreign fighters from Syria and Iraq slipping and living undetected into Sandjak is a real possibility. Similarly to Kosovo Updated Assessment of the Flow of Foreign Fighters into Syria and Iraq, The Soufan Group, 2015, available at Data contained in the latter report reflect both 2014 and 2015 findings. In the case of Serbia, the Sandjak, and Kosovo numbers have been updated and reflect 2016 findings. Data collection criteria and methodology: Data gathered based on official government estimates, UN reports, think-tank research reports, academic sources, and other open source and secondary sources. The report cautioned about methodological weaknesses in collecting data about foreign fighters, specifically in that 1) data reporting entities often fail to disclose their data collection criteria and methodology, hence potentially affecting the accuracy of data, 2) while the number often reflects all foreign fighters traveling to join violent groups in Iraq and Syria, others report such number by deducting the number of returnees and those who have died, and 3) women and children are omitted in some reports, while in others they are not. 11 UNHCR, Country Reports on Terrorism-Serbia, December 19, 2016, available at Reuters, Serbia backs jail terms for Serbs fighting in foreign conflict, October 10, 2014, available at

9 findings, interviewed officials stated that those who are known to the police would be arrested upon their return and subsequently convicted and imprisoned if deemed a threat to society. However, that there are others who may have already falsely declared themselves killed in Syria and Iraq, or who will do so, and then surreptitiously return to live secretly in the Balkans without identity documents. Likewise, extremist ideologies and groups supporting these ideologies continue to thrive in the Sandjak region, as evidenced by the growing presence of conservative groups such as Wahhabi/Salafi with ties to extremist groups, despite the likely loss of ISIS held territories in Iraq and Syria, alongside socio-economic factors that create vulnerabilities to these ideologies, making for continued radicalization a reality even if ISIS and al-nusra fail to continue to succeed in their activities in Syria and Iraq. 12 Indeed, the migration of of extremists may increase the short and long-term dangers to the Sandjak region, including Serbia as a whole, if prevention, intervention, and remediation efforts are not planned now and carried out well in the coming months and years. This requires gaining a thorough understanding of the actors involved, their pathways into extremist violence, and taking effective steps to block such trajectories, specifically by stopping ideological preaching in support of violent extremism, discrediting terrorist ideologies, stopping face-to-face and Internetbased recruitment and financingand, most importantly, addressing the underlying factors that create both vulnerabilities and motivations for individuals to want to join such groups as well as support them on an ideological and operational levels. Likewise, for those already on the terrorist trajectory, effective steps must be taken to reverse them and stop such individuals from seeding themselves both in prisons and outside of them spreading the danger to the Sandjak region and Serbia as a whole. This requires thorough knowledge, monitoring, and good rehabilitation programs for those already deeply involved. There will be those who cannot be rehabilitated, which will require suitable prison practices to keep such individuals isolated from other prisoners vulnerable to being recruited. As pointed above, although the State has achieved significant progress on the counterterrorism realm and has expressed its resolve to address the issue of foreign fighters seriously, as evidenced by the passage of foreign fighter legislation in 2014, there is a lack of comprehensive national strategies and actions plans on countering violent extremism. In addition, there is a lack of policy or programmatic discussion on the role of women in preventing violent extremism, rehabilitating former extremists, or how they can be included in the country s national counterterrorism initiatives and strategies. Despite the relatively low number of women involved in the Syrian and the Iraq conflict, women in the Sandjak region, including in Novi Pazar, can play an important role in fighting violent extremism in the region. Government and nongovernmental initiatives should take women s roles in extremist groups and their roles both in preventing and in countering violent extremism seriously, and policies and practices should include them. The following reports on our study of radicalization to violent extremism in general and women s roles in particular within the Sandjak region both in becoming violent extremists and in preventing and countering violent extremism. 12 The Associated Press, Sandjak Police Say They Prevented Terrorist Attack on Israeli Team, The New York Times, November 17, 2016, available at:

10 Defining Violent Extremism and Extremist Constructs in the Region This section will briefly cover constructs such as Salafism, Wahhabism, Islamism, radicalization, and violent extremism. In order to fully understand policy implications of the intended research, the readers must become familiar with the constructs that form its foundation. Radicalization v violent extremism The terms such as radicalism, radicalization, and violent extremism remain poorly defined and understood. While some authors equate radicalization with terrorism, radicalization is in actuality often a precondition to terrorism, 13 while others point out that it is not always the first step toward terrorism or violence. 14 In either case, radicalization represents a process by which individuals are introduced to an overtly ideological message and belief system that encourages movement from moderate mainstream beliefs towards extreme views. 15 Radicals are the ones who challenge status quo, though not necessarily through violent means and can also be positive forces in society. While the term radicalization is often equated with the term extremism, there are significant differences between the two. There is a distinction between open-minded (radicals) and close-minded extremists. 16 Many government agencies in the West tend to make a distinction between violent and non-violent extremism, the latter often referred to as cognitive form of radicalization, 17 with the former being a form of radicalization that endorses violent solutions to political problems, including at times terrorism. According to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the term violent extremism is defined as encouraging, condoning, justifying, or supporting the commission of a violent act to achieve political, ideological, religious, social, or economic goals. 18 The term violent extremism is often intertwined with the term terrorism, meaning it is used synonymously with the term terrorism, and there is a lack of a precise definition of violent extremism and its relationship with terrorism. However, the UN Security Council Resolution S/RES/2178/2014, stresses the link between violent extremism and terrorism 19 and the need to prevent violent extremism, which can be 13 Marc Sageman, Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008) Michael and Hallundbaek, Lars, Al-Shabaab: The Internationalization of Militant Islamism in Somalia and the Implications for Radicalisation Processes in Europe, Ministry of Justice, Copenhagen. (2010). 14 Bartlett, Jamie and Miller, Carl. The Edge of Violence: Towards Telling the Difference between Violent and Non-violent Radicalization. Terrorism and Political Violence 24, no.1 (2014) Ibid., p.2 16 Schmid, P. Alex. Radicalisation, De-radicalisation, Counter-radicalisation: A Conceptual Discussion and Literature review, International Centre for Counter Terrorism, The Hague (2013), p Vidino, Lorenzo, Countering Radicalization in America, United States Insitute of Peace, Washington, D.C. (2010). 18 Federal Bureau of Investigation, What is Violent Extremism, Federal Bureau of Investigation, n.d., available at 19 United Nations, Resolution, 2178 (2014), p.2, available at

11 conducive to terrorism. 20 While there are literally hundreds of competing definitions of terrorism, for the purpose of this report we are opting for a simple definition: political violence carried out by non-state actors and aimed at civilians for the purposes of influencing or achieving political, ideological, religious, social, or economic goals. Islamism The term Islamism refers to an ideology and movement that calls for creation of an Islamic State(s) governed by the principles of Islamic Law or al-shariah. Implementing shariah law usually implies the process of replacing jahiliyya (paganism) with hakamiyya (the rule of Allah). 21 Since the early seventeenth century, several names were associated with the ideology of Islamism. The modern day and more radical formulations were those of Hassan al-banna ( ) of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, Sayed Maududi ( ) of the Pakistani Jamaat-e-Islami, and Sayyid Qutb ( ) of the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt. Ayman Zawahari, founder of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad (1980) and current leader of the militant Islamist and terrorist group, al-qaeda, also subscribes to this particular ideology and movement, as do current leaders in ISIS and Khomeini of Iran. 22 Salafi ideology and Wahhabism The term Salafism is used to describe the fundamentalist ideological element occurring within Sunni Islam today. Its main hallmark is a call to all modern Muslims to revert to the practices and lifestyle of the Prophet Muhammad and his companions encompassing the exact behaviors and actions of his generation and the two generations that followed him. Salafism emphasizes Islam as an ultimate system of belief and governance and is extremely conservative in its outlook condemning any changes to original practices of Islam as sinful innovations. It also preaches God s oneness, while condemning polytheism (shirk) and unbelief (kufr). 23 While more commonly discussed in the context of Saudi Arabia s history, studies on Salafism and Wahhabism (a revivalist movement founded by Muhammad ibn Abd al-wahhab in the eighteenth century that drew largely from Salafi ideology) began to attract considerable attention following the events of 9/ Ibid. 21 Hasan, N. (2006). Laskar jihad: Islam, militancy, and the quest for identity in post-new order Indonesia. Ithaca, NY: Cornell Southeast Asia Program Publications, pp Lechner, J. F. (2009). Globalization: The making of world society. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley-Blackwell, p Moussalli, A. (2009). Wahhabism, Salafism and Islamism: Who is the enemy? Retrieved from p.4 24 Delong-Bas, N. (2007). Wahhabi Islam: From revival and reform to global jihad. Retrieved from Zarei, M. (2013). Islamic scholars view about Wahhabism. Journal of Social Issues & Humanities, 1 (2),

12 While Salafi-Wahhabi movements have been relatively successful in establishing themselves in many parts of the world, such movements often make inroads in those areas where an ethnicnationalist struggle is prominent or other insecurities, including discrimination, against Muslim populations prevail. 25 As an extremely black and white version of Islam with clear boundaries and a multiplicity of rules that if followed promise benefits in this life as well as eternal salvation in the next, Salafism/Wahhabism can be seen as a religious ideology that can provide a sense of comfort, structure, and security to those living in fearful, anxious, unjust and concerning circumstances. In the context of the Balkans, some authors attribute the spread of radical Islamist doctrine of Salafism (which in the Balkan region is often utilized interchangeably with the term Wahhabism) to the break- up of former Yugoslavia, the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the UN embargo imposed on all six former Yugoslav from Methodology The report relies on field research. An exploratory and qualitative research design was undertaken in Novi Pazar, the Sandjak region, between November 27th and November 30th, The research design was utilized to understand drivers of radicalization as well as gather evidence to understand the extent to which policies and programs integrated gender perspectives. Prior to data collection, the authors conducted desk research review of existing literature and relevant policy documents, such as strategic documents, action plans, etc., on the topic in the municipality of Novi Pazar, including Serbia. This phase was instrumental in generating relevant background information on the topic as well as developing appropriate research instruments of inquiry and identifying a target pool of research participants. Semi-structured and open-ended interview questions were employed to allow research participants to identify and elaborate on problem areas, explain who could be trusted for solutions, and identify key gaps and opportunities for effective interventions and solutions. Focus group discussions were also employed with the members of the Multi-Task Force working on the referral mechanism for the prevention of extremism and radicalization. The list of institutions/individuals interviewed included: Representatives of local NGOs Religious leaders Political representatives/city Council representatives Representatives of national institutions 25 Zarei, M. (2013). Islamic scholars view about Wahhabism. Journal of Social Issues & Humanities, 1 (2), Basha, D., & Arsovska, J. (2013). Radical route: Salafism in the Balkans. Retrieved from

13 Representatives of the Multi-Task Force comprised of judges and local NGO and international consultants Representatives of international organizations (e.g. OSCE, Swiss Embassy). Available credible reports on the phenomena generated by government, international organizations, and NGOs were collected. The entirety was then analyzed to understand violent extremism in the region and specifically to discover the roles of women in violent extremism, their vulnerabilities and motivations for joining such groups, as well as the potential to involve them in prevention and intervention efforts from the side of government, community and nongovernmental interventions. Data on foreign fighters was also sought, but the authors found that it is difficult to come by publicly available and official data related to the participation of the citizens of Novi Pazar in the Syrian and the Iraq conflict. The authors hoped to interview conservative Wahhabi/Salafi themselves, including their family members, but were unable to reach them and gain trust for interviews given time constraints. Data collection methods also consisted building upon a two-decades career of interviewing and studying extremists and terrorists around the globe and a thorough knowledge of existing literature and data on extremists and terrorist groups such as al-nusra and ISIS. Likewise, given that the first author spent the last year interviewing ISIS defectors globally, she was quite knowledgeable about their methods of recruitment, indoctrination, networks of funding, and travel, and was able to interview explicitly on these topics with all subjects who were able to divulge information of this type. Guiding questions for the field research were sent to the UN Women s Office both in Belgrade and in Istanbul to help with the mission preparation. ANALYSIS-FINDINGS Trajectories into Violent Extremism and Terrorism in the Sandjak Region Many participants stressed the national government s secrecy in discussing the issue of involvement of the citizens of the Sandjak region in the Syrian and the Iraq conflict. It is also difficult to come by demographic data. As one of the participants noted, Police and government [central government] just mention participation but don t talk about numbers or manifestations of it. 27 Estimates according to participant responses are that individuals from all over Serbia have travelled to the conflict zone in Syria and Iraq since the beginning of conflict in 2011, though some sources place that number to be from the Sandjak region alone. Some sources credited twenty to thirty to be from the Sandjak region and from Novi Pazar. At least three are believed to have died. There are no official estimates for returnees, including data on women 27 S.K. Interview, October 27, 2016, Novi Pazar.

14 who have traveled to Iraq and Syria, although at least three women from Novi Pazar 28 (Alma Smailovic, Lejla Brahovic, and Emina Plojovic) are reported to have traveled to Syria two of them with their two children. 29 Five individuals were indicted in 2014 for involvement in the Syrian and the Iraq conflict. Currently, there are 2 pending cases involving 6 individuals accused of fighting with ISIS but not traveling there and 21 accused of providing logistical support to ISIS As pointed out above, official demographic data on foreign fighters, including women and children who have traveled to Syria or Iraq, are either lacking or are incomplete. Some may also be hidden from authorities by covering their travel to Syria and Iraq as work migration or other travel, or simply having gone unnoticed by authorities and unreported by their families and community members who may fear the repercussions for them should they return to the region. From the available statistics and interviews with government officials, however, it stands that a majority of those for whom data exist are aged between A majority of them come from below average or poor financial and economic backgrounds. Most of them had only finished high school. For women who have traveled to Syria the age range is between Tthe majority of women traveled with their spouses. 31 The Wahhabi s Based on respondent estimates, the Wahhabi presence in Novi Pazar numbers approximately 1,000, though they are also present in Sjenica and Priboj of the Sandjak region. The first group is believed to have arrived in the Sandjak region in 1997 from Sarajevo, Bosnia, and they are said to be heavily backed by Saudi funds. They represent a minority and fundamentalist face of Islam relative to the general Muslim population. In the Sandjak region, the Wahhabi followers are usually young and come from criminal backgrounds, though there are also moderate Wahhabi followers comprised of doctors, intellectuals, engineers, and students who have studied in Nis and Sarajevo. According to participant respondes, there are also others who are simply innocent and easily deceived into following such extremist ideology. 32 Even though the exact relationship between the Wahhabi s and ICiS remains unclear, many respondents noted the 28 As cited in Balkan Investigative Reporting Network, Balkan Jihadists: The Radicalisation and Recruitment of Fighters in Syria and Iraq, March 2016, available at 29 BLIC, 18 Imena: Ovi su Teroristi iz Srbije koji se bore za Islamsku Drzavu, June 11, 2015, available at 30 Denotes age at the time of travel; Western Balkan foreign fighters age ranges 16-74, with an average of 32 years of age. The recent research indicates that age groups susceptible to recruitment among ethnic Albanians vary based on the country (e.g. Kosovo and Macedonia, 21-25; Albania, 31-35, etc. This could be attributed to varying social, economic, and political circumstances and dynamics in such countries, Kosovo s younger median population age, etc. See 31 Denotes age at the time of travel. See BLIC, 18 Imena: Ovi su Teroristi iz Srbije koji se bore za Islamsku Drzavu. 32 S.K. Interview, October 27, 2016, Novi Pazar.

15 latter s encouraging and welcoming support of the Wahhabi s at least in the early stages. Many respondents referred to the former Mufti s, Muamer Zukorlic s, support for the Wahhabi element perhaps as a result of receiving cash infusions and as a bargaining chip with Belgrade that is, in terms of promises made to control this more fundamentalist element from entering into violent extremism. The dynamics changed, however, following the attempt on the part of the Wahhabi s to assassinate Zukorlic, including a series of incidents at mosques that led to the eventual ban of the Wahhabis from ICiS-controlled mosques. This however resulted in Wahhabi groups going underground, meeting informally and outside the purview or control of the official muftiate. Mechanics of Recruitment Participants explained that social media continues to play a major role in the recruitment of individuals towards a violent path and serves as powerful tool for promoting extremist ideologies. Some also mentioned the local media, Sandjak Press, for instance, as playing a role in spreading extremism and encouraging people to travel to conflict zones in Iraq and Syria. As one of the respondents explained, Nobody pays attention to what is being written [in Sandjak Press]. In a single day, they printed 12 articles about Syria and Palestine. They wrote about injustice and how people defend Islam, portraying a dangerous picture of the situation but not condemning terrorist organizations. 33 Although there are no reports of recent travel to Iraq and Syria on the part of the citizens of Novi Pazar, respondents noted that recruiters, both face-toface and online, remain active. Recruiters are said to continue to be active and present during various charitable and social gatherings and events in the Sandjak region. Claims are made that funding from the Saudis and the Sandjak region diaspora based in Vienna continues to pour in to support those holding and promulgating violent extremist views as well as to support family members of those killed as foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq. Several of the respondents noted that Islamic extremists are linked to Wahhabi communities in Novi Pazar and the Sandjak region and are usually operating through unofficial mosques 34 Respondents also reported cases of recruiters targeting young migrants originally from the Sandjak region in Vienna. For instance, a young man whose father was killed in childhood while enlisted in one of the wars in the territories of the former Yugoslavia, traveled to Vienna and was immediately approached by recruiters who offered him a shelter, fellowship, free food, and overpaid him for random odd jobs while indoctrinating him with militant jihadi extremist views and a strong sense of purpose and belonging in the extremist group. Humanitarian and Altruistic Motivations alongside Strong Posttraumatic Identifications with Victims of Interethnic and Sectarian Conflicts Humanitarian reasons and strong identification with Assad s victims in Syria were one of the most commonly cited reasons for joining the conflict. The long-term psychological legacy of 33 S.K. Interview, October 27, 2016, Novi Pazar. 34 Ibid; M.J.,City Council Representatives Interview, October 29, 2016, Novi Pazar.

16 wars in the Balkan region (e.g. Bosnia and Kosovo) still casts a long shadow in the Sandjak region, creating serious vulnerabilities to terrorist recruitment. The background of having experienced the Balkan wars, either through hearing about it from relatives or having directly experienced war traumas in childhood (e.g. seeing or hearing about war atrocities), and remembering that it was foreign interventions that saved them in some instances interventions that failed or came in late, such as in the case of the 1995 Srebrenica massacre in Bosnia caused many in the first and later waves to deeply identify with what they referred to as their Sunni brothers and sisters suffering from Assad s atrocities. However, even though motivations were simpler and less endorsing of terrorism in the first wave, it was clear that even then clandestine recruitment networks and financing for travel to Syria were in operation inside the Sandjak region. The ability and mastery of groups in Syria to utilize social media to vividly portray the conflicts in Syria to those living outside the conflict zone cannot be underestimated as a strongly motivating factor for many in the Sandjak region to become foreign fighters. Similar to sentiments shared in Kosovo, many respondents pointed out how many who have traveled to the conflict region viewed videos of the regime s atrocities towards civilians and felt acutely sensitive to wanting to help their Syrian Sunni brothers and sisters. In this sense, they identified with the Syrians on religious basis, from common experience and on a fictive kin basis feeling a deep and strong responsibility to go and fight in their defense. Discrimination and Marginalization of Muslim Communities by Serbia and Islamophobia Respondents often cited marginalization and discrimination as deeply radicalizing elements in Sandjak. Many referred to economic incentives to foreign investment always being directed by Belgrade to Christian areas of Serbia rather than to the Sandjak region and infrastructure, education and infusions of state capital coming last and least to their region. Look at our roads, one complained, while another said that higher educational institutions were not funded by the central government in Novi Pazar leading to the community to have to build its own Islamic university. High rates of unemployment and unproductive futures for youth were often blamed on Serbian national governance and many felt that Sandjak s Muslim communities were blamed, ostracized and overlooked for development leaving the youth vulnerable to groups like ISIS that promise purpose, significance, leadership, honor. Skinheads and Serbian nationalist movements are active in Belgrade and throughout Serbia and caused some respondents to note that they changed their Islamic names to Christian versions when attending university in Belgrade and kept a low profile. These aspects of Islamaphobic experiences and perspectives of neglect by the central governance toward their region when compared to the all inclusive promises of the ISIS Caliphate can create dangerous vulnerability to recruitment.

17 Hijrah, Jihad, End Times Prophetic Thinking and The Call of the Caliphate Since it declared its Caliphate in 2014, ISIS began promoting it as an ideal, utopian Islamic state where justice and prosperity would ultimately reign and those who wished to live under shariah law should come. ISIS also began announcing and promoting it as a place where Muslims of every race and ethnicity would be included in an all-inclusive (to Muslims) alternative government and given significant roles, which created an unprecedented response, not only in the Sandjak region, but also worldwide. 35 The ISIS invitation to jihad was successful for numerous reasons, including the advent of social media and the ability to cast an enormous propaganda net with immediate feedback as to who liked, retweeted, and otherwise endorsed their materials, allowing ISIS recruiters to make contact with vulnerable individuals and seduce them into traveling to the battleground. Among those from the region who have traveled to Iraq and Syria during the last two years, or are currently engaged with terrorist groups in Iraq and Syria, it was clear that religious and ideological motives that invoked the struggle as jihad in the name of Allah and ideological motives that called for protection of all Muslims and the creation of an Islamic State were the most commonly cited reasons for joining terrorist groups, and remain among the primary motivating factors. 36 ISIS propaganda very strongly promotes the individual responsibility of all Muslims to take hijra (migration to Islamic lands) as well as the individual duty to fight jihad (fard al-ayn). Likewise, ISIS also preaches End Times prophetic theology, citing the coming battles in Dabiq (Syria) and inviting all Muslims to join the ultimate apocalyptic battles. The ideological call is made to invoke a sense of duty while also promising materialistic and spiritual benefits (e.g. free housing, cars, food and propane allowances, the promise of marriage and sex slaves, and the rewards of martyrdom for those who die in battle, etc.) alongside the chance to live by what ISIS proclaimed as a truly Islamic lifestyle under Shariah law. The terrorist groups propaganda and appealing narratives spread prolifically over the Internet, showing both the atrocities of Assad and the appeal of joining the End Times prophetic battle and building the Caliphate, alongside the spiritual and materialistic benefits accrued by doing so, thus creating a powerful worldwide appeal. It was one that resonated especially to citizens of the Sandjak region who strongly identified with the victims of interethnic and sectarian conflict and it was multiplied in the small Wahhabi communities who have already withdrawn from mainstream society advocating living by shariah law. 35 ISIS has managed to call the largest migration of foreign fighters ever to a battlefield. Estimates are that approximately 38,000 foreign fighters have left for Syria and Iraq many to ISIS. Zarqawi s earlier call to jihad with al-qaeda in Iraq produced only 5000 foreign fighters, while the jihad in Afghanistan produced less than 2000 foreign fighters. 36 S,K. & M.J. Interviews, October 27-29, 2016, Novi Pazar.

18 Recruitment by successful leaders in the battlefield (e.g. Abit Podbicanin, a notorious ISIS commander from Velika Zupa, Prijepolje) also made it clear that they could aspire to become prominent players in this Caliphate as well as extremist networks operating on the ground providing financing and logistical support to travel to Syria easily facilitated the movement of citizens of Novi Pazar, including the Sandjak region, into the conflict zone. It should be noted, however, that not all went to Syria and Iraq with the intention of fighting. As informed by the respondents, some went simply to pursue a life inside the ISIS Caliphate, travelling with their families to the conflict zone to live in the Islamic State according to what they believed would be the righteous principles of Islam and not to necessarily participate in hostilities. 37 What happened once there was another story, however. Foreign Assistance and Muslim Identity as a Vulnerability and Motivating Factor Both Islamic Communities in the Sandjak region follow and practice the Hanafi school of Islam, a traditionally liberal and moderate version of Islam, as do the majority of the Sandjak s citizens. With the fall of the former Yugoslavia, however, Turkey and Gulf countries entered helping to rebuild mosques, the later introducing Salafi and Wahhabi streams of Islam into the country and creating identity confusion. The schism between the Islamic Community itself has also paved the way to those who promote religious extremism, as well as those who have used extremist elements to promote their political clout in Belgrade while creating a profound confusion as to which religious authority has jurisdiction and power over religious matters in the Sandjak region. In the case of ISIS, black and white thinking and a clear Muslim identity is promised to those who travel to live under the Caliphate, thereby removing any questions in those searching for their identity and trying to find their way living, according to ISIS, as a true and good Muslim. Salafi Islam can be protective against militant jihadi ideologies of groups like ISIS and al-qaeda if taught in ways that denounce their call to violence in the name of jihad and Takfiri extremes (i.e. denouncing and allowing for killing Muslims and others who do not adhere to their strict interpretations of Islam). However, if it is not taught in this manner, Salafi streams of Islam can also provide a ready gateway into more extremist Takfiri streams of thinking and acting. It appeared from respondents that the Takfiri ways of thinking were infecting the highly conservative, secretive, and withdrawn masses of the population in the Sandjak region. Desire for Freedom from Repressive Government Policies For those practicing Wahhabi/Salafi strand of Islam and associated with mosques and towns where there are many who traveled to Syria, government surveillance can become a motivating factor for others to also leave for Syria and Iraq. The desire to practice Islam and live by shariah practices without government surveillance and interference or Islamophobic attitudes by moderate or secular citizens was a motivating factor for some. While according to respondents 37 Ibid.

19 the state security services continue to view conservative communities in the region (e.g. Wahhabi/Salafi) as a security threat, there are others who did not share such sentiments and denied the existence of such threats on a large scale. More specifically, some respondents stated that most Wahhabi/Salafi adherents are peaceful and are often exploited for political reasons, adding that such policies unjustly target religion for political purposes. Even more importantly, the same argued, powerful religious institutions (e.g. Islamic Communities) often exploit the Serbian state to target such communities for their own political goals and expediency. The argument was also made that discrimination against any religious community (often blamed on the media), especially in an environment that is deeply rooted in poverty and ethnic tensions, can only further exacerbate the existing tensions, making it easier for extremist groups to recruit new members. 38 Ignorance, Lack of Education, and Illiteracy as Vulnerabilities Respondents reported on the naiveté of poor and rural, stating that many are aware of work migrants to Europe and believe it is like landing in Paradise. As a result of these positive examples of migration, they also are easily convinced the same about Syria when sold that view by terrorist recruiters. Many who become involved are said to live in isolated villages and know little of the world and thus easily fall prey to recruiters claims. In the Sandjak region, as elsewhere affected by terrorism, foreign recruitment into groups like ISIS is often facilitated by arguing with recruits that the recruiter is able to speak Arabic, whereas the recruit is not. Therefore, they are told they should not question the Koran as interpreted to them by the recruiter able to read the Koran in its original language and interpret it as placing the duties of hijrah, jihad, protection of the Muslim ummah, and building the Caliphate upon them. Material Benefits of Joining ISIS foreign fighters are promised salaries, free housing, food and propane allowances, the possibility of cars, arranged marriages, and sex slaves. The group sends out pictures of large homes with swimming pools as possibilities so seductive that a thirteen- year- old from U.K. being groomed for travel to ISIS reported she thought she would be traveling to ISIS Disneyland if she joined. 39 When asked about his pay, one Kosovar foreigner fighter to ISIS reported his monthly salary as being equal to those of high paying politicians in the country [Kosovo], which is a tempting alternative compared to average monthly salary of $200 in Kosovo. 40 This would be similar in the Sandjak region where salaries are commensurate to those in Kosovo. In addition to high paying salaries, some ISIS defectors have reported supplementary income in the thousands of 38 J.M.., & and Focus Group Interviews, October 30, 2016, Novi Pazar. 39 Yasmin Green personal communication June Ardian Shajkovci, interview ISIS foreign fighter, 2015, Kosovo.